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Abstract
Given the inherent ad-hoc nature of popular communication platforms, out-of-band authenticated
key-exchange protocols are becoming widely deployed: Key exchange protocols that enable users
to detect man-in-the-middle attacks by manually authenticating one short value. In this work we
put forward the notion of immediate key delivery for such protocols, requiring that even if some
users participate in the protocol but do not complete it (e.g., due to losing data connectivity or to
other common synchronicity issues), then the remaining users should still agree on a shared secret.
A property of a similar flavor was introduced by Alwen, Coretti and Dodis (EUROCRYPT ’19)
asking for immediate decryption of messages in user-to-user messaging while assuming that a shared
secret has already been established – but the underlying issue is crucial already during the initial key
exchange and goes far beyond the context of messaging.
Equipped with our immediate key delivery property, we formalize strong notions of security for
out-of-band authenticated group key exchange, and demonstrate that the existing protocols either
do not satisfy our notions of security or are impractical (these include, in particular, the protocols
deployed by Telegram, Signal and WhatsApp). Then, based on the existence of any passively-secure
key-exchange protocol (e.g., the Diffie-Hellman protocol), we construct an out-of-band authenticated
group key-exchange protocol satisfying our notions of security. Our protocol is inspired by techniques
that have been developed in the context of fair string sampling in order to minimize the effect of
adversarial aborts, and offers the optimal tradeoff between the length of its out-of-band value and
its security.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental challenge in cryptography is that of generating shared secrets in communication
networks that are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. When a public-key infrastructure
is available, this task has been thoroughly studied, and many protocols have been suggested
(see Section 1.2). The question remains, however, of how to agree on an initial secret when
connections are formed ad-hoc, and a public-key infrastructure is impractical to maintain.
Such scenarios include, for example, communication platforms offering end-to-end encrypted
messaging services, audio calls or video calls [50, 60, 63, 62, 5, 25, 10, 20, 35, 51, 30, 19, 23,
57, 2, 31], as well as secure pairing of IoT devices (e.g., [22, 37, 11]).
Out-of-band authenticated key exchange. Given that man-in-the-middle attacks are im-
possible to detect without any additional setup, one approach often taken is to provide
users/devices with the ability to communicate “out-of-band”, assuming that they have
access to an external channel through which they can information-theoretically authenticate
short values. Equipped with such an external channel, one can then rely on out-of-band
authenticated key-exchange protocols: Protocols that are tailored to using both a standard
insecure channel and a low-bandwidth out-of-band channel, and enable users to bootstrap
the limited resource of information-theoretical authentication provided by the out-of-band
channel in order to establish shared secrets while detecting man-in-the-middle attacks. Such
an approach is taken by most communication platforms providing end-to-end encryption and
by protocols for pairing of IoT devices (see the references above).
The out-of-band channel typically corresponds to having the users compare with each
other a short value displayed by their devices (or having a single user compare a string
displayed by all paired devices in the context of pairing of IoT devices), but can in fact be
based on a variety of real-world assumptions (e.g., [43, 27, 56, 42, 32, 22, 37, 59, 63]). In
most implementations the “manual” flavor of the out-of-band channel introduces a tradeoff
between the effort invested by the users and the security guarantees: A longer out-of-band
value may enable better security in principal, but also incurs a more intensive user effort,
thus hurting usability and ultimately security.
Non-interactive vs. interactive protocols. As in standard key exchange, there are two
main flavors of out-of-band authenticated key-exchange protocols: Non-interactive protocols
in which each user sends at most one message and this message is sent independently of
the other users’ messages, and interactive protocols in which users may send more than one
message and these messages may depend on other users’ previously-sent messages.1
Non-interactive protocols are widely used by messaging platforms (e.g., WhatsApp and
Signal [63]), since they do not require any two users to be online at any particular point in
time. However, such protocols are inherently limited in the security they can provide – as we
discuss in Section 1.3.
1 These two flavors of protocols are sometimes referred to as “asynchronous” protocols vs. “synchronous”
protocols (e.g., in the specific context of messaging protocols [52, 19, 2, 31] – to which we do not
at all limit ourselves in this work). As discussed below we follow the more standard terminology of
non-interactive protocols vs. interactive protocols since the standard model of synchronous computation
in distributed computing is much more restrictive than the standard model required for interactive
cryptographic protocols in general, and for the protocols considered in this paper in particular (e.g., a
global clock synchronizing the entire execution of the protocol among the various parties is not required
[41, 3]).
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Our focus: Immediate key delivery in interactive protocols. In various popular scenarios,
such as voice and video calls or pairing of IoT devices, the users or devices participating
in the protocol are typically expected to remain online throughout its execution. In these
scenarios, unlike in messaging applications, interactive protocols may be used in order to
ensure stronger security guarantees (e.g., security which is independent of the adversary’s
concrete running time). This is the case, for example, in the out-of-band key-exchange
protocol Telegram uses for its voice calls [59].
An additional approach to constructing interactive out-of-band authenticated key exchange
protocols is to first run any passively-secure key-exchange protocol, and then use an out-
of-band message authentication protocol in order to authenticate its transcript [61, 49,
54]. An out-of-band message authentication protocol allows for the authentication of long
messages while using the out-of-band channel only to information-theoretically authenticate
one short value. Although any solution to the general task of establishing shared keys
must inherently rely on computational assumptions, out-of-band message authentication
protocols may provide unconditional information-theoretical security. By now there is a
sound theoretical understanding (i.e., protocols and matching lower bounds) of out-of-band
message authentication protocols, in both the user-to-user and the group settings, as well as
practically-relevant protocols in both settings [61, 48, 46, 54, 44] – these works were indeed
motivated by the task out-of-band authenticated key exchange.
In contrast, out-of-band authenticated key exchange has been studied in the user-to-user
setting (e.g., [49, 40]) but has been left without any rigorous treatment in the group setting.
In particular, when considering the security of out-of-band authenticated key exchange in
the group setting, a crucial requirement is that even if some users participate in the protocol
but do not complete it, then the remaining users should still agree on a shared key that
will enable them to start interacting in an end-to-end encrypted manner. We refer to this
property as immediate key delivery. Alwen, Coretti and Dodis [2] have recently suggested
a property of such flavor to which they referred to as “immediate decryption”. Their work
was in the context of messaging protocols assuming that a shared secret key has already been
established – but the underlying issue is crucial already during the initial key exchange.
Providing immediate key delivery is a challenge that arises only in the interactive setting,
as it is trivially guaranteed by any non-interactive protocol (but, as discussed above, such
protocols provide somewhat weaker security guarantees). Although interactive protocols are
suitable for scenarios in which users are typically expected to remain online, protocols still
have to address cases where some of the users do not complete the protocol. Otherwise, for
example, any user who loses connectivity prevents the successful completion of the protocol
by the remaining users. Moreover, if a protocol does not offer immediate key delivery, then
it becomes very easy for an attacker to prevent the users from agreeing on a shared secret,
by simply blocking all outgoing communication from a single user in the group.
The significant and practical importance of immediate key delivery, together with various
other security considerations for out-of-band protocols, motivate an in-depth examination
of out-of-band authenticated key exchange, including formal definitions and protocols that
satisfy them.
1.1 Our Contributions
Motivated by the above-described state of affairs, we present the following contributions:
We suggest a framework for analyzing out-of-band authenticated group key-exchange
protocols, capturing crucial security and functionality properties that arise in the group
setting for out-of-band protocols.
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We observe that the existing approaches for constructing out-of-band authenticated
key-exchange protocols either do not satisfy our (standard) notions of security or are
impractical (already for rather small groups). This situation highlights the fact that it is
highly non-trivial to satisfy our notions of security while keeping the out-of-band value
short.
Based on the existence of any passively-secure user-to-user key-exchange protocol (e.g., the
Diffie-Hellman protocol), we construct an out-of-band authenticated group key-exchange
protocol satisfying our notions of security, and offering the optimal tradeoff between the
length of its out-of-band value and its security. Moreover, for some possible use-cases,
instantiating our protocol in the random-oracle models leads to a concrete and efficient
protocol.
In what follows we briefly discuss each of these contributions, and the reader is referred
to Section 1.3 for a more elaborate and technical overview.
Modeling out-of-band authenticated group key exchange. We consider a group of users
communicating over a completely-insecure channel that is susceptible to man-in-the-middle
attacks, and in addition assume that some user of the group can information-theoretically
authenticate one short value to all other users who have not yet aborted, over the out-of-band
channel (note that we do not make any assumptions as to the particular identity of that
user).2
Within this communication model (which we formally define in Section 2), we put forth
a realistic framework and notions of security for out-of-band authenticated key-exchange in
the group setting, considering the following three requirements:
Pseudorandomness: If a man-in-the-middle adversary does not interfere with the
communication, the resulting shared key should be computationally indistinguishable
from an independent and uniformly-distributed key given the transcript of the protocol
which includes the out-of-band value.
Man-in-the-middle detection: If a man-in-the-middle adversary does interfere with
the communication, this should be detected except with probability (λ) + negl(λ), where
 is a pre-determined function of the security parameter λ ∈ N, and negl is a negligible
function which may depend on the adversary.
Most importantly,  must be fixed for all adversaries, and in particular it is not allowed
to depend on the adversary’s on-line or off-line running time or space usage – as the
effective length of the out-of-band value might not always be sufficiently long (e.g., when
executed by “lazy users” who may not consider the out-of-band value in its entirety [44]).
Immediate key delivery: Even if a subset of the parties aborts the execution of the
protocol before its completion, the remaining parties should still agree on a shared key (the
abort decisions may be determined adversarially throughout the execution of the protocol).
This requirement significantly strengthens the standard correctness requirement of key-
exchange protocols, and achieving this requirement is the core technical contribution of
our work.
2 The way that the out-of-band value is propagated through the group might be different; e.g., if some
users recognize the voice of one user in a voice group call, and the other users recognize the voice of
another user, then informing all users of the out-of-band value requires the two recognized users to read
it out loud. Our model, in which there is a single out-of-band value and a single user who sends it, can
always be easily translated to such situations (e.g., by having an out-of-band channel from each of the
said users to the users in the group who recognize her voice).
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Note that the pseudorandomness and man-in-the-middle detection requirements are relevant
already in the user-to-user setting (and we consider natural extensions of these requirements
from passively-secure protocols to out-of-band protocols), and that the immediate key delivery
is a new requirement that we introduce in the group setting.
Existing protocols do not meet our requirements. We show that even though the three
requirements listed above seem fairly standard as far as cryptographic definitions go, they are
not met by existing protocols. Namely, we observe that each of the out-of-band authenticated
key-exchange protocols deployed by Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram, and that the protocol
suggested by Rotem and Segev [54] does not satisfy at least one of the aforementioned
requirements.
Already in the user-to-user setting, we show that the protocol deployed by Telegram does
not satisfy our pseudorandomness requirement, and that the protocols deployed by Signal
and WhatsApp do not satisfy our man-in-the-middle detection requirement. In the group
setting, even though these protocols provide immediate key delivery, they are non-scalable
in terms of the length of the out-of-band value, since they require running a user-to-user
protocol with each member of the group separately, resulting in an out-of-band value whose
length depends linearly on the size of the group. For example, in a group of size 32, in order
to get 60 bits of security, the out-of-band value in these protocols has to be of length at
least 31× 60 = 1860 bits (i.e., the initiator of the key exchange has to compare at least 560
decimal digits with other users). In the group setting, the protocol of Rotem and Segev,
which relies on the above-mentioned transcript-authentication approach [49] is more practical,
and satisfies our pseudorandomness and man-in-the-middle detection properties, but does
not provide immediate key delivery.
We stress that as mentioned above, some of these protocols have their advantages in
particular use cases. However, the fact that none of them provide both optimal security
guarantees per our security notion and also immediate key delivery in the group setting,
exemplifies in our view the difficulty that lies in satisfying all of these requirements simulta-
neously and highlights the challenges that need to be overcome. Looking ahead, the main
reason that immediate key delivery is challenging to obtain without substantially increasing
the length of the out-of-band value, is that an adversary may choose a subset of aborting
users out of an exponential number of such subsets – and this allows the adversary significant
control over the execution of the protocol.
From strong(er) message authentication to out-of-band authenticated key exchange.
We construct an out-of-band authenticated group key-exchange protocol which satisfies
our notions of security, based on any passively-secure user-to-user key-exchange protocol.
Moreover, we prove that our protocol enjoys the optimal tradeoff (within lower-order terms)
between the length of its out-of-band value and the probability of an active attack going
undetected.3
I Theorem 1 (informal). Assuming the existence of any passively-secure user-to-user key-
exchange protocol, then for any functions n = n(λ) and ` = `(λ) there exists an out-of-band
authenticated key-exchange protocol for groups of n(λ) users, with an out-of-band value
of length `(λ) bits such that any active man-in-the-middle attack is detected except with
probability (λ) ≤ 2(n(λ)− 1) · (1/2 + o(1))`(λ), where λ ∈ N in the security parameter.
3 Our protocol provides such an optimal tradeoff even when executed by “lazy users”, who may not
consider the out-of-band value in its entirety, as recently formalized by Naor et al. [44].
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Our protocol is based on a general transformation that takes any passively-secure key-exchange
protocol and produces an out-of-band authenticated key-exchange protocol. Concretely, we
observe that although the above-mentioned transcript-authentication approach (i.e., using a
group out-of-band message authentication protocol in order to authenticate the transcript of a
passively-secure group key-exchange protocol) fails to guarantee immediate key delivery, this
can be overcome if the underlying message authentication protocol provides a property we
refer to as immediate message delivery (the precise transformation requires overcoming various
additional challenges). We construct such a strengthened out-of-band message authentication
protocol by starting from the basic structure of the group protocol of Rotem and Segev,
and incorporating within it techniques from the realm of fair multi-party string-sampling
protocols (i.e., protocols in which even if some parties abort then the remaining parties
sample a “relatively unbiased” string [4, 18] – see Section 1.3 for more details). We view this
as our main technical contribution.
A benefit of the fact that we present our protocol as a general transformation while
relying on generic building blocks, is that this enables for a much greater modularity in its
instantiation. In particular, this allows for the reliance on post-quantum secure assumptions
as opposed to the currently deployed protocols by Telegram, Signal and WhatsApp that are
based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
1.2 Related Work
The problem of detecting man-in-the-middle attacks in key exchange protocols has been
studied extensively in various models (see, for example, [8, 6, 58, 7, 16, 36] for user-to-
user protocols, and [9, 15, 34] for group protocols). Our setting and definitions bear some
resemblance in particular to that of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE; see
[29, 12, 33, 26, 1] and the references therein), in that in both cases the security is inherently
a function of the unpredictability of some short value (the out-of-band value in our case, and
the shared password in the case of PAKE).
In particular, in the PAKE setting, Fiore, Vasco and Soriente [24] considered the problem
of “partitioned group key exchange” which is conceptually somewhat similar to the problem
we consider in this paper: Designing a PAKE protocol with the guarantee that even if some
users provide a wrong password then all users who provided the correct password should still
agree on a shared key. The main difference, however, between this problem and our work
is the correctness requirement: Fiore et al. assume that all users are on-line and follow the
instructions of the protocol, and require that all users who provide the same password output
the same key, whereas we assume that some users may adversarially abort the protocol at
any stage and require that all other users output the same key. This difference, together
with the substantial differences of the two authentication models, lead to completely different
technical challenges (and solutions).
More generally, although there are natural similarities between the various authentication
models, there are several key differences between our work and the lines of works mentioned
above. Namely, to provide immediate key delivery, our model and definitions accommodate
users who abort prematurely, whereas most of the works on authenticated key-exchange are
either in the user-to-user setting, or consider groups that remain static (i.e., no users are
added or removed) throughout the execution of the protocol. Some works (e.g., [13, 14]) do
consider dynamic groups that may change over time and their shared secret needs to be
updated, but not the scenario that we are studying of users who abort during the execution
of the protocol itself. In that respect, our work is focused on initial key exchange (and its
authentication), and we do not explicitly consider the task of adding or removing users in
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later stages. In any case, adding a user to the group while communicating with only a single
existing member of the group, as is the case with the deployed protocols, can and must be
authenticated using a user-to-user out-of-band protocol. This approach can also be used to
add users who went offline during the initial setup, which again must require an additional
out-of-band verification.
In the out-of-band model, most previous works concentrated on message authentication
[53, 61, 46, 48, 54, 44], with the exception of Pasini and Vaudenay [49] and Lindell [40], who
studied key exchange explicitly, but only in the user-to-user setting. Pasini and Vaudenay
followed the transcript-authentication paradigm described above, while Lindell focused on
analyzing the specific Bluetooth v2.1 comparison-based key-exchange protocol.
1.3 Overview of Our Security Notions and Construction
In this section we first discuss the motivation underlying our three security requirements
(which were briefly mentioned in Section 1.1 and are formally defined in Section 3). Next, we
overview the “transcript authentication” approach for constructing an out-of-band authenti-
cated group key-exchange protocol (which serves as our starting point), and point out its
current limitations. Then, we provide a high-level overview of our construction and of its
proof of security.
Our notions of security. Our work puts forward extensions of the standard notions of
pseudorandomness and man-in-the-middle detection that are tailored to out-of-band protocols,
as well as introduces the notion of immediate key delivery, as discussed in Section 1.1.
Requirement 1: Pseudorandomness given the out-of-band value. The out-of-band chan-
nel is assumed to provide authenticity for one short value, but it is not assumed to provide
any form of secrecy, and thus all communication over this channel may be completely
visible to an adversary. Thus, the natural extension of the standard pseudorandomness
requirement for key-exchange protocol must consider an adversary observing both the
communication over the insecure channel and over the out-of-band channel. For such an
adversary, the resulting shared key should be computationally indistinguishable from an
independent and uniformly-distributed key.
Requirement 2: Adversary-independent man-in-the-middle detection. The probability of
detecting an active man-in-the-middle attack depends (at least) on the bit-length ` of the
out-of-band authenticated value (in Section 3 we provide a simple proof showing that any
protocol can be undetectably attacked with probability essentially  = n ·2−`). We require
that active attacks are detected with probability that depends on the protocol itself (e.g.,
 = n · 2−`), and do not scale in a meaningful manner with the adversary’s on-line or
off-line running time or space usage. For example, our requirement rules out protocols
that out-of-band authenticate an 80-bit value, and an adversary that can execute 240
computations of a certain hash function can break its security with probability 240 · 2−80.
This property is even more crucial when considering the likely scenario of “lazy users”, as
formalized by Naor et al. [44], where users may consider only a short sub-string of the
out-of-band authenticated value. This renders the “effective length” of the out-of-band
value much shorter than its actual length `. For example, if the security that a protocol
provides is T · 2−`, where T is roughly the running time of the adversary and ` is the
length of the “de-facto out-of-band value”, then if the users consider, say 20 bits from
the out-of-band value, an adversary running in reasonable time can break the security of
the protocol quite easily (instead of having the protocol still guarantee the best-possible
security of  = 2−20).
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Requirement 3: Immediate key delivery. We require that even if a subset of the parties
aborts the execution of the protocol before its completion, the remaining parties should
still agree on a shared key. This is a crucial requirement not only due to the above-
described nature of mobile-based messaging, but even more in order to protect against
devastating adversarial denial-of-service attacks that are undetected by other users. For
example, in the recently-suggested protocol of Rotem and Segev [54], an adversary that
can simply block the communication going out of just one user, can make sure that
the other users will never agree on a shared key, leaving the group either completely
vulnerable or utterly useless.
Although this property is a functionality-focused one, our main technical challenge in this
work is to obtain it while retaining a good (and preferably optimal) level of security. As
we discuss in length in the continuation of this section, simple attempts to add immediate
key delivery to the protocol of Rotem and Segev make it completely insecure.
Interaction is essential. Satisfying all three requirements simultaneously requires an inter-
active protocol. The pseudorandomness requirement may be satisfied both by interactive and
by non-interactive protocols (under suitable assumptions). The third requirement, immediate
key delivery, is trivially satisfied by any non-interactive protocol, but as mentioned above,
the second requirement – adversary-independent MitM detection – cannot be satisfied by
such protocols. Concretely, in Section 3 we show that for any non-interactive protocol and for
any running time T , there exists a successful man-in-the-middle attacker that runs in time
essentially T and is undetected with probability min{1/3,Ω(T ·2−`)}, where ` is the bit-length
of the out-of-band value. In this light our goal is to come up with interactive protocols that
simultaneously guarantee all three requirements, while retaining a short out-of-band value.
Our starting point: The “transcript authentication” approach. As mentioned in Section
1.1, the out-of-band group key-exchange protocols deployed by WhatsApp, Signal and
Telegram provide immediate key delivery, but impose a heavy burden on the users: These
protocols require running a user-to-user protocol with each member of the group separately,
resulting in an out-of-band value whose length depends linearly on the size of the group. In
addition, recall that these protocols do not satisfy our two additional security requirements,
and thus they do not seem to be promising starting points for designing protocols satisfying
our goals.
Our starting point is the transcript-authentication approach described above [49], while
using the out-of-band group message authentication protocol of Rotem and Segev [54].
Roughly speaking, this approach suggests running any passively-secure group key-exchange
protocol,4 and afterwards to authenticate its transcript via the following out-of-band message
authentication protocol:
1. P1 chooses rS ← {0, 1}` and commits to trans‖rS to all other users, where trans is the
transcript of the key-exchange protocol from P1’s point of view.
2. P2, . . . , Pn cooperatively choose a string rR: Each Pi chooses ri ← {0, 1}` and commits
to it to all other users. After all users have committed, each Pi decommits to reveal ri,
and sets rR =
⊕
i∈{2,...,n} ri.
4 Most naively, the initiator P1 can execute a user-to-user protocol (such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol)
with each other user Pi for obtaining a shared key ki. Then, P1 will sample a random key k and encrypt
it to each other user Pi using the key ki.
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3. P1 decommits to reveal rS , and then out-of-band authenticates to σ = rS ⊕ rR. Each of
the other users accepts (and outputs the key agreed upon in the key exchange step) if
and only if σ and trans are both consistent with her view.
This protocol falls short of satisfying our definition for out-of-band authenticated group
key exchange in two respects. First, our definition requires that an active attack will be
detected except with some pre-determined probability, but the only guarantee provided by
the protocol of Rotem and Segev is that if trans is inconsistent with the view of some Pi,
then with high probability this Pi will reject. It might still be the case though, that an
active adversary modifies messages sent during the out-of-band message authentication phase
described above.
This problem may be addressed in a simple manner (and in this specific protocol it is not
that devastating to begin with): Instead of using the out-of-band message authentication
protocol in order to authenticate the transcript trans of the group key exchange, P1 samples
a pair (sk, vk) of signing and verification keys for a one-time strongly unforgeable signature
scheme; then uses the out-of-band message authentication protocol to authenticate vk to the
other users; and finally uses sk to sign the transcripts of both the key-exchange protocol and
the out-of-band message authentication protocol.
The second, more fundamental, problem is that the protocol of Rotem and Segev does
not provide “immediate key delivery”, even if the underlying passively-secure key-exchange
protocol does provide it5. This is true since a user who identifies a deviation from the
protocol (including a premature abort) terminates and rejects. In order for the out-of-band
authenticated group key-exchange protocol to provide immediate key delivery, the out-of-band
message authentication protocol needs to satisfy a similar property, to which we refer as
immediate message delivery. This property essentially requires that even if a subset of the
receivers in the protocol abort, but the execution is otherwise honest, the rest of the receivers
should still accept the message.
Alas, the lacuna in the out-of-band message authentication protocol of Rotem and Segev,
due to which it does not provide immediate message delivery, is far from being a mere
technicality. To see why, consider what happens if we simply ignore aborting users, and
take rR to be the exclusive-or of only the ri’s of the users who opened their commitments.
This might provide immediate key delivery, but gravely hurts the security of the protocol, by
giving the man-in-the-middle adversary the ability to choose which commitments to open to
each Pi after observing ri. Concretely, in the full version of this paper [45], we present an
attack showing that this change exponentially increases the forgery probability from roughly
n · 2−` to roughly 2n · 2−`, where n is the number of users in the group and ` is the length of
the out-of-band value.
The underlying issue with the protocol of Rotem and Segev (explaining the exponential
increase), is that a man-in-the-middle adversary interacting with, say Pi, can choose to
abort any subset of {P2, . . . , Pn} \ {Pi} towards Pi, before forwarding the decommitments
of the users in this subset to Pi. Even if the interaction with Pi is otherwise honest, each
possible aborting subset might induce a different value for rR in the view of Pi. This enables
a man-in-the-middle adversary to substantially “steer” the rR that Pi computes, such that
the attack will go undetected.
5 The naive protocol described in Footnote 4 is a passively-secure protocol with immediate key delivery:
Even if some user aborts then the remaining users still output the key k chosen by P1.
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Providing immediate message delivery: Attempt I. As a first attempt to limit the addi-
tional power provided to the adversary by allowing aborts, consider a “restart-after-abort”
variant of the Rotem-Segev protocol, in which after an abort by any of the users, the
remaining users start a fresh execution of the protocol. Intuitively, now the adversary has
no incentive to abort more then a single user in each execution of the original Rotem-Segev
protocol, and the identity of the particular user who aborts (if such a user exists) is of no
consequence due to the symmetry of the protocol. Hence, instead of exponentially many
choices of aborting subsets, in each execution of the original Rotem-Segev protocol the
adversary effectively has only two (abort or not).
The problem with this approach however, is that now the adversary has up to n − 1
attempts to break the security of the Rotem-Segev protocol, yielding a forgery probability of
roughly n2 · 2−`. This is much better than the 2n · 2−` forgery probability of the “vanilla”
Rotem-Segev protocol, but still quite far from optimal: The forgery probability grows
quadratically with the number of users in the group, which may be significant in large groups,
and as we show below, this can be avoided. Moreover, when the protocol is executed by
lazy users as discussed above (who may not consider the out-of-band value in its entirety
[44]), the effective value of ` might be relatively small, resulting in a substantial forgery
probability. Instead, we are interested in a solution that provides security which is optimal
with respect to the size of the group and to the length of the out-of-band value, so that it
provides reasonable security even for lazy users (looking ahead, our protocol provides the
optimal tradeoff within lower-order terms between the length of its out-of-band value and its
security even when executed by lazy users).
Providing immediate message delivery: Attempt II. In light of the above, and inspired
by techniques from protocols for fair string sampling, we construct a group out-of-band
message authentication protocol that provides immediate message delivery – while retaining
an optimal level of security (within lower order terms). The main idea behind our protocol
is to replace the manner rR is chosen in the protocol of Rotem and Segev, with a way which
is more resilient to aborts. By that, intuitively speaking, we mean that even a man-in-the-
middle adversary interacting with some Pi, and can simulate control over all users but Pi
in that interaction, cannot force the rR computed by Pi to hit the particular value that it
needs in order for the attack to go unnoticed by Pi.
Instead of selecting rR in “one shot” as done in the protocol of Rotem and Segev, in
our protocol it is chosen in more gradual manner, which considerably limits the effect of
adversarial aborts. Concretely, the users iteratively choose T `-bit values rR,1, . . . , rR,T
(where T is a parameter of the protocol) one after the other, in T consecutive iterations. In
the tth iteration rR,t is chosen by the remaining users among P2, . . . , Pn (i.e., the users who
have not yet aborted) in the same manner as rR is chosen in the protocol of Rotem and
Segev. Finally, the value of rR in our protocol is then taken to be the bit-wise majority of
rR,1, . . . , rR,T : The kth bit of rR is the majority bit over the kth bits of rR,1, . . . , rR,T . We
refer the reader to Sections 4 and 5 for a complete and formal description of our protocol.
With this change, analyzing our new protocol proves to be technically involved, as a man-in-
the-middle adversary has numerous more possible “synchronizations” (i.e., different orderings
of messages) to impose on an execution of the protocol. Nevertheless, we manage to prove
that when the commitment scheme used in our protocol is statistically-binding and concurrent
non-malleable,6 then the forgery probability is bounded roughly by n ·(1/2+n/√T )`. Setting
6 see the full version [45] as well as [21, 39, 28, 17] and the references therein for further details on such
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the parameter T to be n2 · ω(1) (e.g., n2 · log∗ λ), we get that the forgery probability is
n · (1/2 + o(1))`, matching our lower bound of min{1/3,Ω(n · 2−`)} (see Section 3) within
lower order terms.
Overview of our proof of security. We provide a brief and high level overview of the
proof of unforgeability of our out-of-band message authentication protocol, ignoring various
technical difficulties and focusing on the main ideas. We prove that for every i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
if the man-in-the-middle changes the verification key sent to Pi in the beginning of our
out-of-band authenticated key-exchange protocol,7 then the probability that Pi will not
detect this interference (i.e., will not output ⊥) is upper bounded by roughly (1/2 + n/√T )`.
We do so by considering all possible synchronizations that a man-in-the-middle might impose
on an execution of the protocol relative to Pi, and bound the probability of forgery in each
of them relying on the statistical binding and on the concurrent non-malleability of the
underlying commitment scheme. We manage to partition all possible such synchronizations
into two families, and handle each one separately. For simplicity of presentation in this
overview, we focus on the case where ` = 1 (i.e., the initiator P1 out-of-band authenticates a
single bit), and the reader is referred to Section 5 for our formal proof of security.
Proof of security: Case I. In the first family of synchronizations, P1 decommits to reveal
rS before Pi receives the first round of commitments from P2, . . . , Pi−1, Pi+1, . . . , Pn. In this
case, by the statistical binding, the values of rS and rR according to the view of P1 and the
value of rS according to the view of Pi, have all been determined by the time Pi receives
the first round of commitments. Hence, in order for Pi to not reject, the man-in-the-middle
must make sure that rR according to the view of Pi hits the unique value r∗R ∈ {0, 1} which
is the exclusive-or of the three aforesaid determined values. We bound the probability that
rR = r∗R using the concurrent non-malleability of the commitment scheme, where the heart
of the proof lies in two parts.
The computational part, in which we show that no strategy of the man-in-the-middle can
result in a noticeably-greater probability that rR = r∗R then the following strategy, denoted
Mopt: (1) In each iteration t ∈ [T ] and for every Pj that has not yet aborted according to the
view of Pi, send Pi a commitment to the value 1 from Pj ; (2) If the sampled value in this
round rR,t is equal to r∗R (when no user aborts), then open all commitments; (3) Otherwise,
open all commitments except for that of the minimal-index user Pj that has not yet aborted
(since Pj committed to the value 1, this is guaranteed to flip the bit rR,t, so that it is equal
to r∗R).
We prove that this strategy is optimal in forcing rR = r∗R (within a negligible additive
factor) via a hybrid argument: We start with any other man-in-the-middle adversary M and
gradually change its strategy to Mopt, iteration by iteration, proving that the probability
that rR = r∗R cannot decrease by too much in each change, or the concurrent non-malleability
of the commitment scheme is violated. Concretely, we consider T + 1 hybrids, where the
adversary in the tth hybrid, denoted byMt, plays asM in the first T−t iterations and asMopt
in the remaining t iterations. Observe, that in order forMt to succeed with noticeably-greater
probability than Mt+1 (in forcing rR = r∗R), it must be the case that in the tth hybrid,
commitment schemes.
7 Our protocol in Section 5 is a general-purpose out-of-band message authentication protocol. For
concreteness in this overview, we focus on the case where the message to be authenticated is the
verification key sampled by P1, as is the case in our out-of-band authenticated key-exchange protocol.
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Pr [rR,t = r∗R] is noticeably greater than 1/2. This contradicts the concurrent non-malleability
of the underlying commitment scheme: Intuitively, this is because in an ideal experiment in
which the bit contributed by Pi in the tth iteration is sampled anew just before Pi decommits,
it holds that Pr [rR,t = r∗R] = 1/2.
The statistical part, in which we show that the optimal adversary described above, Mopt,
succeeds in forcing rR = r∗R with probability no greater than roughly 1/2 + n/
√
T . To
prove this, it is convenient to think of an equivalent experiment, in which rR,1, . . . , rR,T
are first sampled uniformly from {0, 1}, and then the adversary is given the option to
flip n − 2 of them.8 In this experiment, the adversary can force rR = r∗R if and only if
|{t ∈ [T ] : rR,t = r∗R}| ≥ T/2 − n + 2. We observe that |{t ∈ [T ] : rR,t = r∗R}| is a random
variable distributed according to the binomial distribution with parameters 1/2 and T . We
then use the symmetry of this distribution and the fact that every value in its support is
obtained with probability no greater than roughly 1/
√
T , in order to bound the probability
that |{t ∈ [T ] : rR,t = r∗R}| ≥ T/2− n+ 2 by roughly 1/2 + n/
√
T .
Proof of security: Case II. In the second family of possible synchronizations, P1 decommits
to reveal rS after Pi has received at least one round (and possibly many) of commitments from
the other users. Denote the last round of commitments received by Pi before P1 decommits
by t∗ ∈ [T ]. In this case the man-in-the-middle adversary’s situation is worse than in Case 1:
The hiding and the concurrent non-malleability of the commitment scheme, and in particular
of the commitment by P1 to the value rS , imply that the adversary cannot hope to force
any of rR,1, . . . , rR,t∗ to be equal to r∗R with probability noticeably greater than 1/2. This is
because in an ideal experiment in which rS is sampled anew just before P1 decommits, it
holds that Pr [rR,t = r∗R] = 1/2 for every t ∈ [t∗] and independently of the other rounds, and
irrespective of the identity of the aborted users in rounds 1, . . . , t∗. Intuitively speaking, it
follows that the adversary is only more limited than in the previous case, as she can use her
“abort quota” effectively only in rounds t∗ + 1, . . . , T , and hence the forgery probability in
this case cannot be noticeably greater than that of the previous case.
1.4 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the out-of-band
communication model, and in Section 3 we present our notions of security for out-of-band
authenticated group key-exchange protocols. In Section 4 we show that any passively-secure
user-to-user key-exchange protocol can be transformed into an out-of-band authenticated
group key-exchange protocol that satisfies our notions of security, and in Section 5 we
construct an out-of-band message authentication protocol with immediate message delivery,
which is the main building block underlying our transformation.
2 The Out-of-Band Communication Model
In this section we review the out-of-band communication model as well as the notion of an
out-of-band message authentication protocol [61, 48, 54].
8 For the case ` = 1, this is indeed equivalent. For the general case of ` ≥ 1, this may only add power to
the adversary, and hence the probability that rR = r∗R can only increase. Hence, in the general case
as well, bounding the probability that rR = r∗R in this experiment bounds the probability that the
man-in-the-middle adversary can force rR = r∗R.
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The out-of-band channel and man-in-the-middle attacks. As formalized by Vaudenay
and by Naor et al. in the user-to-user setting [61, 47] and extended by Rotem and Segev to
the group setting [54], interaction among users in the out-of-band communication model
occurs over two types of channels: Insecure channels and a low-bandwidth authenticated
channel (referred to as the “out-of-band channel”). It is assumed that a man-in-the-middle
adversary has complete control over the insecure channels: The adversary can read, delay
and remove messages sent by the parties over the insecure channels, as well as insert new
messages at any point in time. One may consider various topologies for the network of
insecure channels. For our protocols we assume the minimal such topology: An insecure
channel between some user (e.g., the initiator of the protocol) and any other user in the
group (i.e., a star network).
As for the out-of-band channel, it is assumed that there exists some user that can out-of-
band authenticate one short value to all other users in the group. This value is assumed to
be authenticated but not secret: The adversary may read or remove this message for some or
all users, and may delay it for different periods of time for different users, but cannot modify
it in an undetectable manner. We stress that our requirement of the out-of-band channel
is a rather weak one: We only require that there exists some user that can out-of-band
authenticate a short value to the rest of the group, and we do not apply any restrictions as
to who that user is.
In addition, we do not make any synchronization assumption regarding the out-of-band
channel: We do not assume that all users have to be on-line when the out-of-band value is
transmitted. Specifically, any subset of the users may be off-line at that time, and any user
that comes back on-line will be able to make her own decision regarding the authenticity of
the execution if and when the out-of-band value reaches her (recall that the attacker can
block the out-of-band value to all or to some of the users). See [55] for a more in-depth
discussion of the group out-of-band communication model.
Out-of-band message authentication. An out-of-band message authentication protocol
enables a sender S to authenticate a message m, which may be chosen by the adversary,
to all other users R1, . . . , Rn in the group (n = 1 is the user-to-user setting, whereas n ≥ 2
is the group setting). Once the execution is completed, each receiver Ri outputs either
some message m̂i or the unique symbol ⊥ implying rejection. The following definition was
introduced by Rotem and Segev [54], naturally extending those of Vaudenay and Naor et al.
[61, 47]:
I Definition 2. Let ` = `(λ),  = (λ) and n = n(λ) be functions of the security parameter
λ ∈ N. A group (`, )-out-of-band message authentication protocol for n(λ) receivers and
message spaceM = {Mλ}λ∈N is an (n(λ) + 1)-party protocol, in which S sends at most `(λ)
bits over the out-of-band channel, and the following requirements hold:
1. Correctness: For every λ ∈ N, for every m ∈ Mλ and every i ∈ [n(λ)] it holds that
Pr [m̂i = m] = 1, where the probability is over the randomness of the parties in an honest
execution of the protocol.
2. Unforgeability: For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary M there exists a
negligible function ν(·) such that for every input message m ∈Mλ chosen by the adversary
for the sender S it holds that
Pr [∃i ∈ [n(λ)] : m̂i 6∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ (λ) + ν(λ)
for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, where the probability is taken over the randomness of
the parties and the randomness of M in an execution of the protocol with M as the
man-in-the-middle adversary.
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Existing out-of-band message authentication protocols. In the user-to-user setting, Vau-
denay [61] constructed a protocol in which the forgery probability  is upper bounded by
2−`, where ` is the bit-length of the out-of-band authenticated value, and Vaudenay and
Pasini [48] proved a matching lower bound. In the group setting, considering a strengthened
version of Definition 2, Rotem and Segev [54] constructed a protocol for groups of size n
in which the forgery probability is bounded by (n− 1) · 2−`, and proved a matching lower
bound. Both protocols can be based on the existence of any one-way function [38, 54] via
non-malleable commitments.
3 Out-of-Band Authenticated Group Key Exchange
In this section we first present our strengthened notion of security for out-of-band authenti-
cated key-exchange protocols.9
Pseudorandomness, MitM Detection and Immediate Key Delivery. Our strengthened
notion of security for out-of-band key-exchange protocols consists of three requirements:
Pseudorandomness and man-in-the-middle detection that are relevant already in the user-to-
user setting, and immediate key delivery that we introduce in the group setting (as discussed
in Section 1.3). Our pseudorandomness and man-in-the-middle detection requirements are
natural extensions of these requirements to the out-of-band model:
If a man-in-the-middle adversary does not interfere with the communication, the re-
sulting shared key should be computationally indistinguishable from an independent
and uniformly-distributed key given the transcript of the protocol which includes the
out-of-band value.
If a man-in-the-middle adversary does interfere with the communication, this should be
detected except with probability (λ) + negl(λ), where  is a pre-determined function of
the security parameter λ ∈ N, and negl is a negligible function which may depend on the
adversary. Most importantly,  must be fixed for all adversaries (e.g., it is not allowed to
depend on the adversary’s on-line or off-line running time or space usage).
Our security definition requires that an active attack is detected by all users on the
receiving end of the out-of-band channel, for whom communication to or from them has
been actively modified by the attacker. The task of notifying all other users (who are still
online at the end of the execution) of an active attack can be achieved, for example, by
assuming that all users can send an “out-of-band feedback” signal to all other members,
indicating an attack. Observe that such an assumption (or an assumption of the same
nature) is essential in order for all users to detect an active attack, as without it (i.e.,
with only a single user that can send a message out-of-band and all other communication
being subject to man-in-the-middle manipulation) an active attack in which some of the
users do not identify the attack is always possible.
Our immediate key delivery requirement significantly strengthens the standard correctness
requirement of key-exchange protocols: Even if a subset of the parties aborts the execution
of the protocol before its completion, the remaining parties should still agree on a shared
9 In the full version [45], we show that the protocols deployed by Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram do
not satisfy it already in the user-to-user setting, and that the protocol obtained via the “out-of-band
transcript authentication” approach does not satisfy it in the group setting. We also show that there is
a simple and practically-relevant user-to-user protocol that does satisfy our notion of security (and offers
the optimal trade-off between the length of its out-of-band authenticated value and its man-in-the-middle
detection probability).
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key. To capture this requirement, for an algorithm A and an n-party protocol pi, we let
FailStopExec(pi,A, λ) denote the output of the following experiment:
1. Start an execution of pi with joint input 1λ.
2. For every i ∈ [n] \ {1}, before Pi sends a message v according to pi, invoke decision ←
A(1λ,PartialTrans), where decision ∈ {abort, continue} and PartialTrans is the partial
transcript of the execution up to this point. If decision = continue, Pi sends v, and the
execution continues. If decision = abort, Pi aborts and the execution continues without
Pi.
3. The output of FailStopExec(pi,A, λ) is a (n+1)-tuple (AbortSet, v1, . . . , vn), where AbortSet
denotes the set of indices of aborted parties at the end of the execution and vi is the
output of Pi if Pi 6∈ AbortSet and vi = ⊥ otherwise.
Note that in order for this experiment to be well defined, the protocol pi has to be well
defined for any possible pattern of aborts. In that case, this experiment is well defined both for
group key-exchange protocols (including passively-secure ones) and for group authentication
protocols (looking ahead, this experiment will enable us to formalize a notion of “immediate
message delivery” for authentication protocols). When pi is a key-exchange protocol, we use
k1, . . . , kn instead of v1, . . . , vn to denote the output keys of the users.
Also note that we assume that P1 does not prematurely abort throughout the execution.
This is essential, as we will assume without loss of generality that P1 is the user that can
send a short message over the out-of-band channel. Hence, if P1 aborts prior to sending the
out-of-band value, no meaningful security can be guaranteed. Practically speaking, in the
context of messaging platforms, P1 who initiates the key-exchange protocol is typically the
first party to send an encrypted message to the group. Hence, if P1 aborts, the need for a
shared key is postponed until another message is sent (at which point, the users will execute
the out-of-band group key-exchange protocol when initiated by a potentially different user).
Our definition, provided below, relies on the following notation. We denote by
MitMExec(pi,M, λ) the distribution over (n + 1)-tuples (viewM , k1, . . . , kn) induced by an
execution of the protocol with a man-in-the-middle M , where the adversary and all parties
run on input 1λ, and viewM is the view of M at the end of the protocol (k1, . . . , kn are
defined as before). For every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let Activei be the event in which the adversary
actively changes the communication from or to Pi; i.e., by either modifying or removing
messages sent from or to Pi or by inserting new message to or from Pi.
We also define the event Active: Informally, Active is the event in which the man-in-the-
middle adversary M changes the communication among the parties in any manner that goes
beyond simulating an abort by a subset of the parties (by simulating an abort by a party,
we mean blocking all messages sent by that party from some point onward). More formally,
let q = q(λ) be a bound on the number of rounds in an execution of pi on joint input 1λ.
For an execution according to MitMExec(pi,M, λ), we denote by Msgsi = (mi,1, . . . ,mi,q) the
vector of messages sent (in order) by Pi, where if Pi has sent t messages for t < q, we denote
mj = ⊥ for every j ∈ {t + 1, . . . , q}. Similarly, we denote by M̂sgsi = (m̂i,1, . . . , m̂i,q) the
vector of messages received (in order) by parties other than Pi, as messages from Pi. We
denote by Active the event in which for some i ∈ [n], there exits t ∈ [p] such that mi,t 6= m̂i,t
and at least one of the following conditions hold: (1) m̂i,t 6= ⊥; or (2) There exists t′ > t
such that mi,t′ 6= ⊥.
I Definition 3. Let n = n(λ), ` = `(λ) and  = (λ) be functions of the security parameter
λ ∈ N. A group out-of-band (`, )-key-exchange protocol over key space K = {Kλ}λ∈N for a
group of size n = n(λ) is an n-party protocol pi = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉, in which P1 sends at most
`(λ) bits over the out-of-band channel and the following requirements hold:
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Immediate key delivery: For every λ ∈ N and every probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A, it holds that
Pr [∀i ∈ [n(λ)] \ AbortSet : k1 = ki ∈ Kλ] = 1
where (AbortSet, k1, . . . , kn)← FailStopExec(pi,A, λ).
Man-in-the-middle detection: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M
there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
Pr [∃i ∈ {2, . . . , n(λ)} : Activei ∧ ki 6= ⊥] ≤ (λ) + ν(λ)
for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, where (viewM , k1, . . . , kn)← MitMExec(pi,M, λ).
Pseudorandomness: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms M and D there
exists a negligible function ν(·) such that∣∣Pr [Active ∧D(1λ, viewM , k1) = 1]− Pr [Active ∧D(1λ, viewM , k) = 1]∣∣ ≤ ν(λ)
for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, where (viewM , k1, . . . , kn) ← MitMExec(pi,M, λ) and
k← Kλ.
We note that when n = 2, Definition 3 captures the user-to-user setting. In this case, the
immediate key delivery property simply reverts back to the standard correctness property
of key-exchange protocols. In addition, note that the immediate key delivery property is
defined with respect to an efficient algorithm A, but our construction provides immediate
key delivery even in the case where A is unbounded and receives access to the random coins
of the users.
Interaction is essential. As mentioned in Section 1.3, no non-interactive protocol can
satisfy our man-in-the-middle detection requirement. To see why that is, let pi be such a
non-interactive protocol and let Pi be any user participating in the protocol (other than the
one in charge of sending the out-of-band value). Consider the following man-in-the-middle
attacker, that can compute the secret key outputted by Pi:
1. The attacker forwards all messages sent by the users to all users participating in the
protocol, other than to Pi. Let σ be the true out-of-band value sent as a result.
2. Let mi be the message sent by Pi. The attacker samples T independent tuples of
messages M (1)−i , . . . ,M
(T )
−i for the other users participating in the protocol, and computes
the T resulting out-of-band values σ(1), . . . , σ(T ) (i.e., σ(j) is the out-of-band value in the
execution in which the messages sent are mi and the messages in M (j)−i ).
3. If for any j∗ ∈ [T ] it holds that σ(j∗) = σ, then the attacker sends the messages in the
tuple M (j
∗)
−i to Pi (as the messages sent by the other users in the protocol). Otherwise,
the attacker has failed and she terminates the attack.
Observe that if the attacker completes the attack, then: (1) She knows the randomness
used to sample the messages in M (j
∗)
−i , so she can compute the key outputted by Pi; and (2)
The view of Pi is the same as in an honest execution in which the messages are mi and the
messages in M (j
∗)
−i , so the attack is undetected by Pi.
Hence, in order to analyze the probability that this attack is successful, we need to look
at the probability that there exists such an index j∗. It turns out that we can bound this
probability for any choice of mi, so let us fix mi and look at σ and σ(1), . . . , σ(T ) when Pi
sends mi. These are T + 1 independent samples from the distribution over the out-of-band
value in a random execution of pi, conditioned on Pi sending the message mi. One can verify
that the probability that there exists an index j∗ ∈ [T ] such that σ(j∗) = σ is minimized when
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this conditional distribution is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`. For this distribution,
the probability that there exists such an index j∗ – and that the attack is successful – is at
least min{1/3,Ω(T · 2−`)}. The complete analysis is in the full version of the paper [45].
The required length of the out-of-band value. Theorem 4 states that any out-of-band
group key-exchange protocol for n users with an out-of-band value of length ` bits can be
undetectably attacked by an efficient man-in-the-middle adversary with probability roughly
n · 2−`. As discussed in Section 1.3, a key goal in the out-of-band model is to construct
protocols offering the optimal trade-off between their security and the length of their out-of-
band authenticated value, and our protocols in this paper offer this optimal trade-off both in
the user-to-user setting and in the group setting (within lower order terms). The proof of
Theorem 4 may be found in the full version of this paper [45].
I Theorem 4. Let ` = `(λ), n = n(λ) and  = (λ) be functions of the security parameter
λ ∈ N. For any out-of-band (`, )-key-exchange protocol (over any key space K) for a group
of size n(λ), there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
(λ) ≥ min
{
1
3 ,
n(λ)− 1
4 · 2
−`
}
− ν(λ)
for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N.
Lazy users. Motivated by the recent work of Naor et al. [44], we consider in addition the
security of out-of-band key-exchange protocols when executed by lazy users who may not
consider the out-of-band value in its entirety (e.g., users who compare with each other only
a subset of its positions). Given an out-of-band key-exchange protocol pi = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉
we define a collection of “lazy protocols”, one per each possible subset of positions of the
out-of-band authenticated value. Specifically, given a protocol pi in which the out-of-band
authenticated value consists of ` characters, for a subset I ⊆ [`] of indexes, we consider the
“lazy protocol” piI in which the parties execute pi, with the exception that the party who
sends the out-of-band value does not send the entire value, but rather sends only its substring
that corresponds to the positions in the set I (we refer the reader to the work of Naor et al.
[44] for an in-depth discussion of lazy protocols and of the motivation underlying them).
I Definition 5. Let n = n(λ), ` = `(λ) and  = (λ, ·) : 2[`] → [0, 1] be functions of the
security parameter λ ∈ N. A group out-of-band (`, )-key-exchange protocol pi = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉
for a group of size n(λ) is secure for lazy users if for every I = I(λ) ⊆ [`] the lazy protocol
piI is a group out-of-band (|I|, (·, I))-key-exchange protocol for a group of size n(λ).
4 From Strong Authentication to Key Exchange
We show that any passively-secure key-exchange protocol can be transformed into an out-of-
band authenticated key-exchange protocol that satisfies our strong notion of security (see
Definition 3). Moreover, the resulting protocol offers the optimal trade-off between the length
of its out-of-band value and its security within lower order terms (see Theorem 4). We prove
the following theorem:
I Theorem 6. Assuming the existence of any passively-secure key-exchange protocol, then
for any functions ` = `(λ) and n = n(λ) of the security parameter λ ∈ N there exists an
(`, )-out-of-band authenticated key-exchange protocol for a group of size n(λ) over the same
key space, where (λ) ≤ 2 · (n− 1) · (1/2 + o(1))`(λ) for every λ ∈ N.
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4.1 Immediate Message Delivery and Passively-Secure Immediate Key
Delivery
Our construction relies on two main building blocks that satisfy a property similar to that of
immediate key delivery, as defined in Section 3 via our experiment FailStopExec(pi,A, λ) for
modeling a fail-stop execution of a protocol (note that this experiment is well defined not
only for key-exchange protocols, and can in fact be used to model aborting parties in a wide
range of protocols).
Out-of-band message authentication with immediate message delivery. Our first build-
ing block is a strengthened form of an out-of-band group message authentication protocol,
extending the notion introduced by Rotem and Segev [54] for such protocols (see Definition
2) by asking for immediate message delivery: Even if a subset of the parties aborts the
execution of the authentication protocol before its completion, the remaining parties should
still output the sender’s input message m. Relying on the notion we introduced in Section 3,
this property is formalized by strengthening Definition 2 as follows:
I Definition 7. Let ` = `(λ),  = (λ) and n = n(λ) be functions of the security pa-
rameter λ ∈ N. We say that an (`, )-out-of-band group message authentication protocol
pi = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn−1〉 for groups of size n and message space M = {Mλ}λ∈N provides
immediate message delivery, if for every λ ∈ N, for every algorithm A, and for every input
message m ∈Mλ to S, it holds that
Pr
(AbortSet,m1,...,mn)←FailStopExec(pi,A,λ)
[∀i ∈ [n] \ AbortSet : mi = m] = 1.
In Section 5 we show that an out-of-band message authentication protocol with immediate
message delivery can be constructed based on the existence of any a statistically-binding
concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme (and thus based on any one-way function –
see the full version [45] for specifics). Moreover, the protocol we construct offers the optimal
tradeoff between the length of its out-of-band value and its security (i.e., the adversary’s
forgery probability).
Passively-secure key exchange with immediate key delivery. Our second building block
is a passively-secure key-exchange protocol with immediate key delivery. This is naturally
defined by replacing the standard correctness requirement of passively-secure key-exchange
protocols with our immediate key delivery requirement stated in Definition 3. A passively-
secure key exchange protocol 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 with immediate key delivery can be easily obtained,
for example, from any user-to-user passively-secure key-exchange protocol via the following
simple transformation:
1. P1 samples a random key k← Kλ.
2. For every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, P1 and Pi invoke the user-to-user key-exchange protocol and
establish a shared key ki.
3. For every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, P1 uses a CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme (whose
existence is implied by that of any one-way function) to encrypt k using key ki, and sends
the resulting ciphertext to Pi.
4. Each Pi uses ki from Step 2 to decrypt the received ciphertext, and then outputs the
result of the decryption. P1 outputs k.
It is straightforward to verify that this transformation indeed yields a passively-secure
group key-exchange protocol with immediate key delivery: Even if a subset of the parties
aborts the execution of the protocol before its completion, the remaining parties all output
the key k chosen by P1.
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4.2 Our Construction
Our protocol relies on the following building blocks:
A group (`, )-out-of-band message authentication protocol 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn−1〉 with im-
mediate message delivery, where ` = `(λ) and  = (λ) are functions of the security
parameter λ ∈ N.
A passively-secure group key-exchange protocol 〈PKE,1, . . . , PKE,n〉 with key space K =
{Kλ}λ∈N and immediate key delivery. We assume without loss of generality that each
party in {P2, . . . , Pn} sends messages to and receives messages from P1 only.10
A one-time strongly-unforgeable signature scheme (KG,Sign,Vrfy).
Our protocol, which is denoted by 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 and formally described below, starts
by using the underlying out-of-band message authentication protocol for authenticating a
verification key for the one-time signature scheme. This verification key is generated by the
initiating party (denoted P1), and its corresponding signing key is then used to sign the
transcript of the out-of-band message authentication protocol, as well as the transcript of
an execution of the passively-secure key-exchange protocol. The shared key resulting from
executing the passively-secure key-exchange protocol is the output of each party, assuming
that from this party’s point of view the signature verifies correctly and the out-of-band
message authentication protocol terminates successfully (i.e., no forgery was detected).
For describing the protocol, we assume for simplicity of presentation that all messages in
the protocols 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn−1〉 and 〈PKE,1, . . . , PKE,n〉 are sent to all participating users (and
hence, the transcript of an honest execution of each of the protocols is the same according to
the view of all users).
Out-of-Band Authenticated Group Key-Exchange Protocol 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉
Joint input: The security parameter 1λ.
1. P1 samples (sk, vk)← KG(1λ) and sends vk to all other users.
2. P1, . . . , Pn execute the out-of-band message authentication protocol 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn−1〉,
where P1 runs S on input (1λ, vk), and Pi runs Ri−1 on input 1λ for every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Denote by v̂ki the output of Ri−1 in this execution.
3. P1, . . . , Pn execute the passively-secure key-exchange protocol 〈PKE,1, . . . , PKE,n〉, where
Pi runs PKE,i on input 1λ for every i ∈ [n]. Denote by ki the output of PKE,i in this
execution.
4. Denote by transi the transcript of Steps 2 and 3 according to the view of Pi. P1 computes
σ ← Sign(sk, trans1) and sends σ to P2, . . . , Pn.
5. Denote by σ̂i the signature received by Pi for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. If v̂ki 6= ⊥ and
Vrfy(v̂ki, transi, σ̂i) = 1 then Pi outputs ki, and otherwise Pi outputs ⊥.
The following theorem – which due to space limitations is proven in the full version of this
paper [45] – establishes the correctness and security of our protocol according to Definition 3:
10Note that this is the case in the construction from any passively-secure (user-to-user) key-exchange
protocol sketched in Section 4.1. Moreover, any passively-secure group key-exchange protocol can be
easily compiled into one in which all parties communicate directly solely with P1, by re-routing all
messages through P1 (i.e., if Pi wishes to send some message to Pj , it sends it to P1 who then forwards
it to Pj).
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I Theorem 8. Let ` = `(λ),  = (λ) and n = n(λ) be functions of the security parameter
λ ∈ N. Then 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 is an (`, )-out-of-band authenticated group key-exchange protocol
with key space K for groups of size n, assuming that:
1. 〈PKE,1, . . . , PKE,n〉 is a passively-secure group key-exchange protocol with key space K and
immediate key delivery.
2. (KG,Sign,Vrfy) is a one-time strongly-unforgeable signature scheme.
3. 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn−1〉 is a group (`, )-out-of-band message authentication protocol with im-
mediate message delivery for n− 1 receivers.
If, in addition, 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn−1〉 is secure when executed by lazy users, then 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 is
secure when executed by lazy users.
Note that the existence of any user-to-user passively-secure key-exchange protocol implies
the existence of a one-way function, which in turn implies the existence of a strongly-
unforgeable signature scheme, and (as we show in Section 5) of a group (`, )-out-of-band
message authentication protocol with immediate message delivery and (λ) ≤ 2 · n(λ) ·
(1/2 + o(1))`(λ). In addition, as discussed in Section 4.1, any user-to-user passively-secure
key-exchange protocol implies the existence of such a protocol with immediate key delivery.
Theorem 6 thus immediately follows as a corollary of Theorem 8.
5 Out-of-Band Message Authentication with Immediate Message
Delivery
In this section we construct a group out-of-band message authentication protocol with
immediate message delivery based on the existence of any one-way function (instantiating
the required building blocks in the random-oracle model leads to a concrete and efficient
protocol). We prove the following theorem:
I Theorem 9. Let ` = `(λ) and n = n(λ) be functions of the security parameter λ ∈ N
and assume the existence of one-way functions. Then, there exists a group (`, )-out-of-band
message authentication protocol for n(λ) receivers with immediate message delivery, where
(λ) = 2 · n(λ) · (1/2 + o(1))`(λ).
For a string s ∈ {0, 1}∗ and an index i ∈ [|s|], we let si (or (s)i) denote the ith bit of s. Let
BitWiseMajority be the operation that on input a set of strings s1, . . . , sq of length `, returns
a string s∗ whose kth coordinate is the majority among the kth coordinates of s1, . . . , sq; i.e.,
if BitWiseMajority(s1, . . . , sq) = s∗, then for every k ∈ [`], (s∗)k = Majority((s1)k, . . . , (sq)k).
Our protocol, denoted by pi, is parameterized by the number of receivers n = n(λ) and by a
function T = T (λ) of the security parameter λ ∈ N. The protocol uses as a building block a
statistically-binding concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme Com. As a commitment
scheme may be interactive (unless one assumes the random-oracle model), when describing
our protocol and referring to a commitment to a certain value, we mean the transcript of the
interaction between the committer and the receiver during an execution of the commit phase
of the commitment scheme (when the scheme is non-interactive, a commitment is simply a
single string sent from the committer to the receiver).
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Group Out-of-Band Message Authentication Protocol pi = 〈S,R1 . . . ,Rn〉
Joint input: The security parameter 1λ.
Phase 0: Initialization
1. Each party initializes a set of aborted receivers, based on her view of the protocol. We
denote by AS the set initialized by S, and by Ai the set initialized by each Ri. At the
beginning of the execution AS = A1 = · · · = An = ∅.
Phase 1: Commitments for string selection
2. The sender S, on input m, chooses a random string rs ← {0, 1}`, and executes n (possibly
parallel) executions of Com to commit to the message (m, rs) to each receiver Ri. Denote
the resulting commitments according to the view of S by c1s, . . . , cns , and denote the
commitment received by each Ri by ĉis. S also appends to the first message it sends each
Ri the message m. Denote by m̂i the message received by each Ri.
3. Each receiver Ri chooses random `-bit strings ri,1, . . . , ri,T ← {0, 1}`, and commits to
them to the sender S using T (parallel) executions of Com. For every i ∈ [n] denote
the resulting commitments according to the view of Ri by ci,1, . . . , ci,T , and denote
the commitments received by S by ĉi,1, . . . , ĉi,T . If some receiver Ri aborts during the
commitment protocol, then S updates AS = AS ∪ {i}.
4. For every i ∈ [n], S forwards to Ri the commitments
{(
ĉj,1, . . . , ĉj,T
)}
j∈[n]\{i} received by
her in Step 3 of the protocol, as well as AS . We denote by
{
(ĉj,1→i, . . . , ĉj,T→i)
}
j∈[n]\{i}
and ÂSi the forwarded commitments and the aborted set, respectively, as received by
Ri. In addition, Ri updates Ai = ÂSi.
Phase 2: Gradual decommitments for string selection
5. For t = 1, . . . , T :
a. For every i ∈ [n], Ri sends to S a decommitment di,t of her commitment ci,t from
Step 3. Let d̂i,t denote the decommitment received by S. For every i ∈ [n] the sender
S then checks whether d̂i,t is a valid decommitment to ĉi,t. If so, let r̂i,t denote the
committed value. If some receiver Ri either sends an invalid decommitment or aborts
before sending di,t, then S updates AS = AS ∪ {i}. For every i ∈ AS , S lets r̂i,t = 0`.
b. For every i ∈ [n], S forwards Ri the decommitments (d̂j,t)j∈[n]\{i}, as well as AS .
We let (d̂j,t→i)j∈[n]\{i} and ÂSi denote the decommitments and the set received by
Ri, respectively. Ri updates Ai = Ai ∪ ÂSi. If for some j ∈ [n] \ (Ai ∪ {i}) it holds
that d̂j,t→i is not a valid decommitment to ĉj,t→i received by Ri is Step 4, then Ri
updates Ai = Ai ∪ {j}. Otherwise, denote by (r̂j,t→i)j∈[n]\{i} the values obtained by
opening the commitments. For every j ∈ Ai, Ri lets r̂j,t→i = 0`.
c. S computes σt =
⊕
i∈[n] r̂i,t, and for every i ∈ [n], Ri computes σ̂i,t =
ri,t
⊕
j∈[n]\{i} r̂j,t→i.
6. For every i ∈ [n], the sender S sends receiver Ri a decommitment dis to the corresponding
commitment from Step 2. Denote by d̂is the decommitment received by Ri. For every
i ∈ [n] the receiver Ri checks if d̂is is a valid decommitment to ĉis. If it is, denote the
committed value by (m̂i, r̂is). If it is not a valid decommitment, then Ri outputs ⊥ and
terminates.
Phase 3: Out-of-band verification
7. S computes σR = BitWiseMajority(σ1, . . . , σT ) and sends σ = rs ⊕ σR over the out-of-
band channel. For every i ∈ [n], Ri computes σ̂Ri = BitWiseMajority(σ̂i,1, . . . , σ̂i,T ), and
outputs m̂i if σ = r̂is ⊕ σ̂Ri. Otherwise, Ri outputs ⊥.
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The following theorem captures the security of our protocol, and its proof can be found in
the full version of this paper [45] (recall that in Section 1.3 we provided a high-level overview
of the proof). Setting T (λ) = (n(λ))2 · ω(1) yields Theorem 9 as an immediate corollary.
I Theorem 10. Let ` = `(λ), T = T (λ) and n = n(λ) be functions of the security parameter
λ ∈ N, and let Com be a statistically-binding concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme.
Then, the protocol pi is a group (`, )-out-of-band message authentication protocol for n re-
ceivers with immediate message delivery, where (λ) = 2 ·n(λ) ·
(
1/2 +O
(
n(λ)/
√
T (λ)
))`(λ)
.
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